Preface

David C. Braun,

Prolegomena to Any Future Noumenology

(Copyright 2006 David C. Braun)

Motto:

Gedanken ohne Inhalt sind leer, Anschauungen ohne Begriffe sind blind.

- I. Kant, Kritik der reinen Vernunft A51/B75.

[“Thoughts without contents are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.”

(tr. of F. Max Müller)]

ta gar aorata autou apo ktisewV kosmOu toiV poihmasin nooumena

kaqoratai, h te aidioV autou dunamiV kai qeiothV

[lnvisibilia enim ipsius a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intel-­

lecta conspiciuntur sempiterna quoque eius et virtus et divinitas.]

- Ad Romanos I. xx.

Preface

I

Any knowledge worthy of the name is knowledge of the truth.  The convention of the sensible world I know as “Western civilization” assigns the knowing of truth, at least of the sensible world, to the empirical [or, more properly, the mathematico-empirical or logico-empirical] sciences.  These sciences treat of the phenomena of the world, with an eye not merely toward explanation but also toward prediction.  In some enterprises these sciences are, to some extent at least, so successful that their practitioners and their supporters come to a confident profession of their exactitude vis-à-vis the truth.  The society of this conventional, sensible world has come to regard these sciences as expositive of the truth; so great is this regard that, e.g., the law regards scientific facts as facts properly the subject of judicial notice without further proof (testimonial or otherwise) and disallows certain types of tests (e.g., polygraphs) for want of scientific support.[1]

At least one position in the field of Western thought has appeared that would crystallize the whole of these sciences into one grand science.  [I do not speak merely of the physicists’ attempt to find a unified-field or unified-force theory, which some such call a “theory of everything,” though that name is indicative of the position to which I refer.]  This position, that all sciences can be crystallized into one, translated, means not merely that there is one unified “science of truth,” but that whatever is not of its component parts is not of knowledge of the truth.  Thus, for example, one finds in logical positivism rejection, not only of metaphysics and systematic ethics, but of all philosophy as anything other than a mere elucidation of the meanings of propositions of knowledge [which are neatly divided into propositions of logic and of facts].

The point of the instant work is simply to show that any justification of the logico-empirical sciences as exact means to arrive at the truth must raise questions unanswerable in the framework of such a position and to answer those “unanswerable” questions which, if unanswered, leave the very sciences without rigorous justification.  That this bold mission does not merely assume a metaphysical prejudice I aim to show in the work.  Hitherto I have trusted the validity and end of the logico-empirical sciences, the object of which is the phenomenal realm.  Seeing that an entire field of thought touches this realm most fundamentally, I might be tempted to elucidate the foundation of any science of truth on such a phenomenology,[2]  though it might be more apt to consider phenomenology a kind of preface or introductory part of the “science of truth.”  The ground for this supposition I assign likewise to the main part of this work, although I note that if phenomenology is a science, it likewise needs justification.

II

Hitherto I have spoken of philosophy in connection with the branches and indeed the idea of knowledge, and of the position of logical positivism on philosophy.  Philosophy, that “love of wisdom,” is considered as academic realm and thus divided among different substantive branches [epistemology, metaphysics, ethics, and — in some schemata — aesthetics].  Logical positivism eschews almost all philosophy as field of knowledge and substitutes philosophy as activity, as elucidating activity toward the terms of knowledge in general.  This could in effect be considered an epistemology, or (more correctly) a doctrine of the possibility and conditions of knowledge, though cast in terms of “meaning.”  A close reading of the position papers of this now moribund ideology of science shows that “meaning” refers really to cognitive content. From that is that position clearly to be seen for what it is, an epistemological doctrine.

The question raised hitherto, that of the justification of the logico-empirical sciences, is the question of epistemology vis-à-vis those sciences. As put by another author, philosophy is thought about thought about a thing.[3]  In effect, philosophy is the business of justifying any means for arriving at any truth. One may find this most apt when applied to epistemology, though reflection on the sequel may bring to light in what way metaphysics and ethics fit under this idea of philosophy.  [It is to be noted, however, whether for grounds related hereto or otherwise, that I eject aesthetics as the study of what is regarded as the beautiful (as opposed to that of what ought to be so regarded or not so regarded, and what ought not to influence my aesthetic sense for what reasons) from philosophy. I hope it finds its home in the sciences.]  As any system of knowledge, even that of theology [if it be properly a branch of knowledge rather than of mere faith, though I may come to ask herein to what extent is not science based on mere faith], needs a ground of certitude to be truly knowledge called, I propose herein to deal with that matter, a matter fundamental to philosophy as also to science so as to prompt me to call it fundamental philosophy.

I propose to delve into the questions of fundamental philosophy, to lay a foundation for the sciences and for every possible branch of any knowledge.  I do not expect, in so doing, to embrace logical positivism; indeed to it or its predecessors in interest I may direct comments throughout at variance with its views or those related views within its tradition.  In so saying, I may note with a limited amount of favor some views, e.g., of Wittgenstein [with whom I am in no wise completely in agreement, to be sure!].  I expect to find more fruit for my purposes in the critical endeavors of Kant, although I take not every view of his as mine.  The careful reader may note my debt to Descartes as well, as also to others whom I deem it either unnecessary or premature to mention.

III

The most commonplace and basic statement regarding knowledge relates to its origin, that it originates, in sense-experience and in intellectual operation.  Doubt arises about the reliability of that knowledge when one considers the former’s phenomenality, i.e., that it is what appears, that it appears to be given.  For at times the senses are misled, are visited with dreams or hallucinations, commonly held to exist in and for the subject alone [even by those who trumpet a facile objectivism].  How, one could ask, might it not be likewise possible that what one ordinarily would concede to be objectively real might not be equally tenable as mere dream?  How, for example, would one avoid the question of the Chinese who dreamed he was a butterfly and arose to ask whether he were not in truth a butterfly that dreamed it was a man?[4]

The first answer one might be tempted to offer, almost certainly in good faith (but without great reflection, immediately), is that such a notion as that of Zhuang Zhou made no sense, was irrational.  For, one could argue, by noncontradiction, the true identity would remain constant.  I might dream I was a butterfly, a cat, a stone; I would arise to be what I continuously regard myself to be in waking.  Thus any constant self I ought to credit as actual.

One notes from the above, on careful examination, an argument proceeding from a dearth of empirically gathered material, by ratiocination,[5] the latter part of the source of knowledge set forth at the beginning hereof.  Moreover, this operation is closely allied to certain fundamental laws, usually elucidated in logic as laws of thought, especially the principle of noncontradiction (i.e., it is false that A is not-A).  But many have complained that (1) reason is a prostitute; (2) syllogism begs the question; (3) reasoning might in some case mislead and is thus uncertain.  The initial response is that, as long as the thinker avoids fallacies and adheres strictly to the definitions pertaining to the harmonic, the result will be as certain as the law of noncontradiction, which pertains to the harmonic.  [Of syllogisms proceeding from universals to particulars, for example (the case citable as circular or question-begging), the result is not fallacious to the extent of the harmony of definitions of the universal in question and other particulars thereof.  So if, e.g., Socrates died, Plato died, Aristotle died, etc., and I am of their form also, ceteris paribus I should likewise die, although some would point with glee to my downfall regarding Enoch or Elijah (if they are believers) only if they ignore my caveat.]  One should recall, moreover, that “definition” should be taken in the sense of that set forth, whether by experience or by voluntary act, which is incorrigible; as a good example I cite direct experience of, e.g., the whiteness before me in sight.  Whether that page is “real” or “dreamed,” it nevertheless is experienced as white.  From this should it be clear that logic based on the laws of thought [of identity, noncontradiction, and the excluded middle, to be specific] can operate validly with respect to that which is harmonically defined, or given as A=A in its moment at least.  [This is not to say that we have no definition without a sensory experience’s given, though we clearly begin with the field of definitions.]

But again we return to the question of Zhuang Zhou’s dream:  Is not self-experience itself, that incorrigibility of definition which, together with the general proposition of causation [ex nihilo nihil fit], to be discussed below, assures the validity of an existent Cartesian ego, beset at times with the problem of harmonicity vel non of its object?  To what experiences should I give priority; to what experiences should I give no value in any task?  If I suppose that the ego [or its ground] is harmonic, thus admitting those experiences to have value which are not of contradiction, do I not appeal to a matter not within my sensation, i.e., a subsisting ground, thus setting as answer what cannot be achieved by my equipment for knowing?  Is it not possible that, outside my experience, there is nothing harmonic, nothing consistent, perhaps even nothing?

The problem, succinctly put, is this:  Is the sensory, harmonic world in and for the subject alone?  Aside from the perceiving subject, are that world and the ego [as] nothing at all?  Can we legitimately, without confusion, without violating rules of the faculties of knowledge, speak of truth?  Of “knowledge” itself?  I expect to set forth, in showing in what way these terms are legitimate, a showing that my questions are legitimate and meaningful in a cognitive sense.  To the phenomenalists and others whose objections I noted above, I say that any giving priority to the harmonic experiences of the self, without accepting the nonharmonic ones except as topics for discussion in terms of a causal deep structure and a theory of independent objects, must lack any justification in their thought’s undergirding.  This bankruptcy of phenomenalism is manifest in its [confessed?] inability in the aforementioned area of critical importance, not only to the possibility of self-knowledge but also to that of any predictive, descriptive science.  Part hereof has yet to be elucidated; the matter set forth below will shed light thereon and develop its implications more fully.  I confess, however, that phenomenalism places a difficulty in the way which, if insurmountable, will render “knowledge” and “truth” impossible, except in the most trivial sense.

IV

Ere I leave these introductory remarks to pass to the meeting of the challenge, I must recommend a study preliminary to the instant inquiry.  As I assume that the reader is familiar with these writers, I can save much space and avoid needless duplication by pointing in the directions hereinafter set out.  The familiar may nod in recognition; the unfamiliar do well to pass thereto. I did not choose the first motto of this work vainly; it is an important sentence of Kant’s justly famous first Kritik.  This is in no wise to say that I agree with Kant’s entire system, as the work will abundantly show.  That work assumes familiarity with much of the prior thought of Europe, but I think it sufficient for the reader to know at least the Discours de la méthode of Descartes.  Although herein are echoes of themes found elsewhere, the foregoing named books will suffice as background herefor.

The structure of the remaining work, in the most general terms, I expect to fall into the following scheme:  First, I will set forth the above problem in full context of the possibility and modi of cognition.  Thence I will essay to answer the question.  Lastly, I will develop the implications to be derived from that which, in answering the questions, I have set forth.  No less than this do I wish to have as my goal, although I confess at this point that I may well leave certain implications thereof undeveloped, nay, untouched.

---

[1] E.g., Fed. Rule Ev. 201(b)(2); Calif. Ev. Code §452(b); §90.202(12), Fla. Stat., for former; Frye v. U.S., 54 App.D.C. 46, 293 F. 1013, 34 A.L.R. 145 (1923); Kaminsky v. State, 63 So.2d 339 (Fla. 1952), as to the latter.

[2] In Appendix III of this work I discuss difficulties involved in actual positions taken by individual historical phenomenologists, even positions taken by phenomenology’s founding father. Those difficulties make it impossible for me to give unqualified endorsement to those positions, even though I can well appreciate the value of phenomenological contributions to the development of philosophical knowledge.

[3] R. G. Collingwood, The Idea of History, p. 1 (London 1975).

[4] I quote, e.g., Tchouang-tseu, oeuvre complète, ch. 2, at p. 45 (Paris 1986): Jadis Zhuang Zhou rêva qu’il était un papillon voltigéant et satisfait de son sort et ignorant qu’il était Zhou lui-même. Brusquement il s’évoilla et s’aperçut avec étonéent qu’il était Zhou. Il ne sait pas si c’était Zhou rêvant qu’il était un papillon, ou un papillon rêvant qu’il était Zhou. [In English: “Once Zhuang Zhou dreamed that he was a butterfly flitting about contented with his condition and incognizant that he was actually Zhou himself.  Suddenly he awoke and discovered to his astonishment that he was Zhou.  He did not know if he were Zhou dreaming that he was a butterfly or a butterfly dreaming that he was Zhou.”]

[5] For now I will neglect the distinction between Verstand and Vernunft, one not a few may regard as overemphasized or illegitimate at present, though this is not necessarily my view.